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ABSTRACT
During recent years, there has been a surprisingly large
amount of bidding for overseas projects, especially in the
middle east area. This boom has contributed to the economic
development of Korea.
But unfortunately, the theoretical and practical studies
of these fields are still unsatisfactorily developed. Also
the recognition of the scientific factors in the pricing
problem by the decision makers is not complete. So, to be
successful in this field, management must concentrate their
efforts on improving the management system.
The purposes of this thesis are; first, to provide a
method of determining an optimal competitive bid by a
scientific approach, and second, bidding to provide a total
system including effectiveness , competitiveness and
efficiency. The model presented here can certainly be a
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I. OBJECTIVE
Bidding for the right to property or for the opportunity
to render service is a relatively pure type of competition
[Ref
. 1] . Opposing bidders compete for rights or opportuni-
ties under rules established by the owner or his consultant
who puts the right or opportunities up for bid. Most
business, especially most construction companies, are
involved in bidding in one form or another, such as bidding
for contracts, for concessions, or for licences to use a
patent.
During recent years, there has been a surprisingly large
amount of bidding for overseas projects in the middle east
area. The projects have been for housing, highways,
aeroports , electrification and various plants. Many Korean
construction companies have successfully won such interna-
tional bidding contests , have been awarded the contract and
are now working on the projects.
These contracts have greately contributed to the
successful execution of the Korean 5-year (5th, 1976-1980)
economic development plan. They initiated the export drive,
and improved the economic status of Korea.
Day by day, the competition becomes keener and keener.
Up to this time, the relatively less expensive Korean labor
has made it possible for their construction companies to

succeed in competitive bidding. But, now the labor rate
of Korea has become high compared with that of other
developed or developing countries, so that South Korean
construction companies can not depend for their competitive-
ness on their cheap labor rate, and must concentrate their
efforts to improve their system of management and the
engineering standards to enhance their competitiveness.
Until now, most countries in the middle east have
invested their oil income dollars in social welfare, with
principal projects in the areas of housing, highways,
aeroports , seaports, etc.
It is expected that after their investment in the field
of social welfare they will invest their oil-dollars in
industry, for example, petro-chemical plants, textile plants
and various power plants. Notice that these are all in the
field of heavy industries. To continue to work on these
projects, it is necessary to foster the engineering and
management systems so as to be of help in generating maximum
profits and continuous employment.
Now, it might be valuable to consider what is the most
effective item to be considered in submitting a proposal in
order to win the contract. The probable criteria for the
selection of the acceptable proposal are; the quality of
materials to be installed, the quality of engineering, the
quality of the technical design, and the financial terms of
the offer to be submitted by the participants. The financial

one is the most important because pricing strategy is funda-
mental in competitive bidding and price directly affects
the profit situation of a company [Ref . 2]
.
Unfortunately, the theoretical and practical studies
of these fileds are still unsatisfactorily developed. Also
the recognition of the scientific consideration of the
pricing problem by the decision makers is not
sufficient. [Ref. 3]
To meet the need for scientific management and to provide
stimulus in competitive bidding, a scientific model utiliz-
ing empirically obtained information is presented in this
thesis.
The purposes of this thesis are; first, to provide a
method of determining an optimal competitive bid by a
scientific approach, and second, bidding to provide a total





If a company wants to join in competitive bidding for
some projects, the strategy must be managed in one depart-
ment of the company. In this case, the managing department
must prepare the indirect cost estimate for the project and
summarize the estimated direct cost from other departments
and its own.
For example, in the case of a housing project, the
architectural department would be the managing department.
It estimates indirect cost and direct cost of architecture,
and then summarizes the relevant civil, electric and
facility costs prepared in the civil engineering department,
electrical engineering department and facility engineering
departments
.
Direct cost is composed of the estimated cost of the
architectural, civil, electrical and facility portions, and
total estimated cost is composed of direct and indirect cost
Figure 1 indicates the process of cost estimation in

















The managing department shall be one of these civil,
architectural, electrical, or mechanical departments as
shown in Figure 1. Finally, to make a price proposal,
i.e., bid amount, this estimated cost is multiplied by some
factor to provide profit.
The process of determining this multipling factor has
been, until now, entirely by the traditional rule of thumb
[Ref. 2]. For example, if the manager wants profit of 25%
of total cost in some project, he will choose 1.25 as
multipling factor and only by intuition consider the
probability of winning.
This traditional rule of thumb type of bidding procedure





Generally two kinds of competitive bidding situations
occur. One is closed (sealed) bidding in which two or more
bidders submit independent bids for the right to property
or to render service [Ref. 1] . In most cases, only one bid
per competitor is allowed and the judge (Central Tender
Committee) accepts the highest or lowest bid as directed
by the rules
.
The other kind of bidding is the auction, or open,
bidding in which two or more bidders continue to bid openly
on an item of value until nobody is willing to increase the
bid, and the last bid is considered the winning bid.
In this thesis, the case of the former, closed (sealed)
bidding will be studied.
A method is presented that determines the optimum bid
price to generate a maximum expected profit in a competitive
bidding situation where each competitor submits only one
closed bid, and where the bidding is for one contract. This
method makes use of the previous bidding patterns of all
possible opposition bidders, and by analyzing these data,
the probability of winning the contract for each bid amount
can be deduced. Finally, the amount of the bid that




A. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE MODEL
In order to delimit the range of application of the model
presented, this section reviews some of the important assump-
tions underlying the model.
1. The probability distributions of each opposing company
are assumed to be continuous, not discrete. [Ref. 4]
Under this assumption, ties have zero probability,
and no provision for handling them is needed.
2. A critical assumption about the probability distribu-
tions is that each bidder has the same degree of
estimating accuracy and will continue the same pattern
of estimating behavior. [Ref. 5]
3. The sole objective of each participant is to maximize
total expected profit. [Ref. 1]
4. The pattern for cost estimates of the company will not
change
.





Consider a case where the owner or his consultant invites
a large number of companies in the same industry to bid for
a contract. Each company interested in obtaining it must
submit a closed bid and the company submitting the lowest





C. DEFINING THE OBJECTIVE
In the process of decision making, the decision maker
who wants to solve some problem must know what the objective
is. A decision is a conclusion or termination of a process
to do something [Ref . 4] . It initiates actions which in
turn generate the need for new decisions. The result of
decision making might generate a great profit or, perhaps,
a great loss for that company.
For example, a company must win a contract in spite of
an expected loss to gain experience in that kind of work,
so that afterwards it can increase the probability of
winning the next project of the same kind. That is, it can
be a strong-point to get a prequalification from the owner
or his consultant in the long run. Also there might be a
case where a company must win a contract in spite of an
expected loss in order to keep the employees from losing
their jobs. [Ref. 4]
However, if the company already has many projects on-
going it might pursue only those with the greatest profit
potential. For a company to adopt any strategy, it is
essential that its objective in the bidding be clearly
defined. [Ref. 1]
In this case, there can be many possible objectives,





a. The most likely objective is to maximize total
expected profit.
b. A second objective might be to gain at least a
certain rate of return on investment.
c. Another possibility is to minimize expected loss.
d. An objective which can be found in a true competitive
situation is to minimize the profits of competitors.
A competitor making a great deal of money will
generally become a stronger competitor and in the
long run hurt one ' s company
.
e. It might be important to obtain the contract, even at
a loss, in order to keep production and employment
going.
These, and other objectives, as well as combinations of
these objectives, are found in a bidding problem. [Ref. 1]
As was mentioned in the section on underlying assumptions,
it is assumed that the opposing company's sole objective is
to maximize total expected profit, and one's cost estimating
pattern and opposing company's pattern of bidding behavior
have not changed.
D. MODEL BUILDING
If the company has worked in that field for years, it
can have data about the relation between estimated cost and
actual cost. The actual cost determined after completion
of the project will, of course, differ from the estimated
cost. It is important, therefore, to determine the bias
and variability of the cost estimate [Ref. 1] . This can
be done by studying past data on estimates and actual cost
that can be obtained after completion of the project. If
16

we get the distribution of the actual cost as a fraction
of the estimated cost, the estimated cost can be refined.
Let Ce and Ca represent the estimated and actual cost
of fulfilling the contract, the ratio of actual to estimated
cost is denoted by S. Then h(S)dS is the probability that
the ratio of the actual cost to estimated cost is between
S and S+dS . The probability distribution is displayed in
Figure 2. [Ref. 1]










0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1-5 1.75
Ratio of actual cost to estimated cost
Figure 2. Reliabiity of cost estimate.
Now if a bid of X wins, the profit will be X - SCe
.
Now, let P(x) be the probability that a bid of X will
be the lowest and win the contract.




E(x) = p(x) X - | SCeh(S)dS (1)
Then value of X for which this expected profit is
maximized is the value of X which should be bid.
If Ce 1 = Ce JSh(S)dS is the estimated cost corrected
for bias, then equation (1) becomes
E(x) = P(x) (X - Ce') (2)
E(x) = expected value of profit
X = bid amount
P(x) = probability of winning the contract at
bid amount of X.
If the probability of winning the contract P(x) can be
determined for each possible bid amount X, the amount
corresponding to the maximum expected value of profit could
be found. [Ref. 4]
Now, the probability of winning can be reasoned out as
the probability of submitting a bid lower than that of all
the other competitors.
If all the participants form their bids independently,
the probability of being lower than all the other bids is










Figure 3. Expected profit vs. Bid Amount
Once the expected profit curve is determined, it is
relatively simple to find the bid amount that maximizes the
expected profit. [Ref. 1]
The difficulty in determining the expected profit lies
in determining P(x), namely, the probability of winning as
a function of the bid amount. In the next section, the
process of obtaining the probability of winning shall be




E. PROBABILITY OF WINNING AND MAXIMUM EXPECTED PROFIT
One way of determining the probability of winning with
a given bid lies in studying previous bidding data acculu-
lated in the company.
Now, suppose we are studying competitor A. On every
previous occasion in which A bid and on which our company
made a cost estimate, we take the ratio of A's bid amount
to our cost estimate. If there are enough previous bids
on which A has bid, a pattern of A's bidding behavior
relative to our cost estimate will emerge as a distinct
distribution [Ref . 4] . These patterns can then be made for
all potential competitors . A few examples are shown in
Figure 4 [Ref. 1]
.
If we know which competitors are going to submit their
bids, the probability of winning for a given bid can rather
easily be computed. Assuming that each competitor is likely
to bid as in the past, which is the best assumption in the
absence of additional information, the probability of being
lower than competitor A by bidding amount of x is the area
to the right of the ratio X/C on A's bidding distribution









1.0 x/c > r
Ratio of Bid to our Cost Estimate
Figure 4. Bidding patterns of competitor A, B, and C.
If P(x) represents the probability of winning, P(x) can
be obtained by multiplying the probability of being lower
than competitor A, 3 and C [Ref. 7] . In Figure 4, P(x) is
the product of areas to the right of x/c on each bidding
pattern, if the competitors are A, B and C only. That is,
P(x) = fA (r)dr fB (r)dr fc (r)dr (3)
Where, f(r) is the probability density function and
_[f<r> = 1
If it is not known exactly which competitor will parti-
cipate in the bid, it is necessary to use the concept of an
average bidder [Ref. 1] . In this case, the bidding
distribution of the average bidder is obtained by combining
21

all previous ratios on an opposition bid to our cost
estimate. The probability density function of average
bidder is plotted in Figure 5 [Ref. 1].
1.0 x/c * r
Ratio of Bid to Cost Estimate
Figure 5. Bidding pattern of average Bidder.
The probability of being lower than K average bidders
becomes
:
P(x) = f (r)dr
- x/c
Now suppose we don't know all of the probable competitors
For example, if there are five competitors, and three of them
are A, B and C, and the others are not known, the probability
of winning the contract becomes
:














So, by applying these probabilities to equation (2) , we
can obtain the expected value of profit. Finally, if we
obtain the expected value of profit for each bid amount and
compare these values, we can obtain the maximum expected
value of profit at each bid level.
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V. CASE STUDY (.CASE OF Z CONSTRUCTION COMPANY)
In this section, the case of the Z construction company
will be studied by analyzing its past bidding data.
The process of obtaining the optimal price to be submit-
ted in future competitive bidding to generate maximum profit
will be presented. The data is from the results of 41
projects in which Z has bid. All of these data are from
information provided by Central Tender Committee (CTC) by
telex each bid during the the period of January, 19 77 to
November, 19 78. The data is;
a. Raw data
b. Ratio of bid to Z's cost estimate
c. Bidding distribution of each competitor
d. Cumulative probability distribution
e. probability of winning, assuming the probable
competitors.
A. RAW DATA
Some of the raw data from which the ratio of each
opposing company's bid amount to Z's cost estimate can be
obtained are shown as a sample in Table I. These raw data
are copies of telexes Z has received from CTC in each
competitive bidding. The results of all 41 bids are
attached at the end of this thesis as an appendix.
24

Using this raw data, we can understand the rank and bid
amount of each participant in each project as indicated by
CTC. As shown in Table I, it is customary to announce the
result of each bid in the form of a ranking and the bid
amount for each participant, this empirically obtained
information can be analyzed to determine the optimal bid
amount that will maximize expected profit in a future bid.
In Table I, the name of project and the name of partici-
pant are eliminated, as they are proprietary.
TABLE I
SAMPLE OF RAW DATA
PROJECT I
No Tenderer Bid Amount Remark
1 A 4,480,000 1.048
2 B 5,093,110 1.191
3 G 5,579,412 1.305
4 Z (4,275,000)
5 I 6,192,733 1.449
6 OTHER 7,815,300 1.828





No Tenderer Bid Amount Remark
1 D 4,879,000 1.075
2 OTHER 5,073,889 1.117
3 A 5,286,500 1.164
4 B 5,380,140 1.185
5 G 5,566,016 1.226
6 Z (4,540,500)
7 I 6,440,535 1.418




No Tenderer Bid Amount Remark
1 Z (7,172,250)
2 D 10,349,551 1.443
3 C 11,024,940 1.537
4 A 11,940,000 1.665
5 I 12,088,709 1.685
6 OTHER 12,183,056 1.699




No Tenderer Bid Amount Remark
1 B 2,595,782 1.230
2 Z (2,109,860)
3 A 2,940,000 1.280
4 D 2,951,028 1.399
5 OTHER 3,556,032 1.685
6 M 3,564,007 1.689
7 N 3,582,544 1.698
8 3,649,500 1.730




NO Tenderer Bid Amount Remark
1 D 4,451,559 1.101
2 Z (4,042,500)
3 M 5,560,000. 1.375
4 S 5,608,000 1.387
5 R 5,940,800 1.470
6 A 6,073,900 1.503
7 K 6,414,254 1.587
8 I 6,433,333 1.591
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In Table I, the last column labeled remark contains
cost estimates for Z and the ratio of the bid amount to Z's
cost estimate for each competitor. The bid amount of Z is
not presented as it also is proprietary. In this case
study, we assume that the cost estimate is equal to the
actual cost obtained after completion of project.
By this assumption, equation (2) becomes:
E(x) = P(x) (x-C)
B. RATIO OF BID TO Z'S COST ESTIMATE
According to the assumptions, if the bidding pattern of
each competitor does not change and neither does Z's pattern
of cost estimating, the ratio of bid amount to Z's cost
estimate can be a good foundation to predict future behavior
of a probable competitor [Ref . 4] . The ratio of the bid
amount to Z's cost estimate in each project for every
competitor is computed and listed in Table II. The entry
in each column indicates the ratio, Xi/C where
i = A.B S.
In Table II, as in Table I, the names of the project and
the name of participant are eliminated for proprietary
reasons, and instead, are indicated as 1-41 and A-S.
Now, before applying these data to the optimization
model, it is necessary to analyze whether these data are
reliable and homogeneous. This is done by indicating




value of standard deviation (S) and coefficient of











are used for mean value, value of standard deviation and
coefficient of each, variation. The coefficient of variation
for each competitor is distributed between 0.0575 and
0.110 3 as shown in Table II.









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A 1.048 1.164 1.665 1.280 1.503 1.374 1.618
B 1.191 1.185 1.230 1.470 1.631 1.362
C 1.537 1.416





I 1.449 1.418 1.685 1.591 1.646 1.588
J 1.401
K 1.699 1.587 1.608













9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
A 1.131 1.482 1.423 1.5*H
B I.067 1.132 1.374 1.472 1.312 1.576
C 1.138 1.301 1.565
D 1.312 1.519
E 1.422 1.424 1-557




J 1.333 1.437 1.333 1.608 I.432 1.379
K 1.407 1.266 1.533
L 1.536 1.493 1.467 1.^97 1-577 1.628
H 1.514 1-557
N
1.538 1.134 1.662 1.584
P 1.085 1.342 1.441
Q 1.^77
R I.562 1.476 1.600





17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
A 1.510 1.691 1.427
B 1.427 1.347 1.483 1.407 1.524
C 1.557 1.663 1.633
D 1.597 1.472
E 1.497 1.647 1.494 1.568 1.307
F 1.474 1.720 1.446
G 1.427
H 1.488 1.532 1.629
I 1.577
J 1.683 1.427 1.629 1-557 1.298





P 1.493 1.473 I.565 1.578 1.524 1.429 1.529
Q 1.432 1.55^ 1.673 1.574 1.456
R I.669 1.5^7 1-536





25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
A 1.463 1.413 1.643 1.362 1.527 1.416 1.516
B 1.507 1.493 1.587 1.538 1.423 1.413 1.342
C 1.556 1.527
D 1.472 1.436 1.362 1.493
E 1.614




1.390 1.481 1.342 1.510
J 1.464 1.537 1.362 1.434
K 1.644 1.487
L I.607 1.433 1.427 1.372
M 1.367 1.523 1.423
N 1.486 1.527 1.492 1.347 1-397
1.463
P 1.434 1.463 I.492 1.523
Q 1.641 1.387
R 1.718 1.471 1-371 I.492






33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
A 1.457 1.491 1.376 1.493 1.283 1.464
B 1.220 1.593 1.427 1.347 1.372 1.357
C 1.737 1.364 1.376 1.517 I.436
D 1.287 1.556 1.434 1.319
E 1.486 1.279 1.543 1.542
F 1.468 1.531 1.335
G 1.465 1.372 1.362 1.446
H 1.621 1.485 1.376 1.464
I 1.574 1.493
J 1.536 1.489
K 1.447 1.456 1.337
L 1.693 I.470
M 1.339 1.466
N 1.412 1.520 1.433 1.452
1.494 1.716
P 1.546 1.576 1.462 1.307
Q 1.463 1.452
R 1.439 1.444 1.317 1.332 1.411






41 M S V
A 1.465 1.437 0.149 0.1037
B 1.394 0.140 0.1004
C 1.488 0.148 0.0995
D 1.385 0.141 0.1018
E 1.482 0.106 0.0715
F 1.357 1.451 0.122
. 0841
G 1.392 0.080 0.0575
H 1.462 1.453 0.102 0.0702
I 1.531 0.096 0.0627
J 1.583 I.470 0.107 0.0728
K 1.405 O.I55 0.1103
L 1.300 1.548 0.123 0.0795
M 1.418 1.480 0.104 0.0703
N 1.481 0.095 . 0641
1.471 0.153 . 1040
P 1.443 0.131 0.0908
Q 1.534 0.124 0.0808
R 1.486 0.111 0.0747
S I.506 0.103 0.0684
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C. BIDDING DISTRIBUTION OF EACH COMPETITOR
From the data on 41 projects (Table II) we can obtain
the frequencies for the occurrence of the various ratio's
and hence the corresponding probabilities. In this analysis,
an interval of 0.05 was used in the analysis of the ratios.
For competitor A and B, the number of occurences and the
corresponding probabilities in each interval (obtained




















1.10-1.15 1 0.036 1 0.033




1.35-1.^0 3 0.107 5 0.167
1.40-1.45 4 0.143 5 0.167
1.45-1.50 7 0.250 4 0.133
1.50-1.55 5 0.179 3 0.100
1.55-1.60 3 0.100




According to the same process, we obtained from Table II
the number of occurrences and the corresponding probabilities
in each interval for all competitors, A through S. These









D. CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
In the data, there are ratios from 1.00 to 1.80 for each
competitor. If we sum the probability of occurrence for each
interval starting with the interval of highest ratio, we can
obtain the cumulative probability distribution of each
competitor. This cumulative probability distribution will
show the probability that a particular bid, expressed as a
multiple of the dicision maker's cost estimate, will be lower
than the bid of each competitor [Ref . 4]
.
As a result, data provide the decision maker sufficient
information to determine the bid which will give the maximum
expected profit, if the probable competitors are known.
The cumulative probability distribution for all





















A 1 0.964 0.964 0.928 0.892 0.892 0.821 0.821
B 1 1 0.96? 0.934 0.867 0.8 0.8 0.7
C 1 1 1 0.93^ 0.934 0.934 0.934 0.867
D 1 1 0.941 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.764 0.646
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.929 0.858
F 1 1 1 1 1 0.95 0.9 0.8
G 1 1 1 1 1 0.889 0.889 0.778
H 1 1 1 1 1 0.933 0.933 0.8
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.97 0.842
K 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.937 0.874
L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.952
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.889
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.909
1 1 1 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.819
P 1 1 0.947 0.947 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.789
Q 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.875

























A 0.714 0.571 0.321 0.142 0.142 0.071
B 0.533 O.366 0.233 0.133 0.033
C 0.734 0.601 0.601 0.401 0.201 0.134 0.067
D 0.528 0.41 0.177 0.118
E 0.787 0.644 0.429 0.286 0.143
F O.65 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05
G 0.556 0.222
H 0.667 0.667 0.333 0.133 0.133
I 0.909 0.727 0.545 0.545 0.182 0.091
J 0.737 0.526 0.368 0.263 0.158 0.053
K 0.811 0.686 0.5 0.375 0.25 0.125
L 0.857 0.762 0.524 0.381 0.286 0.191 0.096 0.048
M 0.778 0.667 0.445 0.222 0.111 0.111
N 0.818 0.636 0.273 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
0.728 0.546 0.364 0.273 0.182 0.182 0.091
P 0.789 0.631 0.369 0.158
Q 0.846 0.692 0.462 0.462 0.308 0.154 0.077 0.077
R 0.75 0.562 0.374 0.187 0.124 0.124 0.062



































E. PROBABILITY OF WINNING AND BID AMOUNT THAT CAN
GENERATE MAXIMUM EXPECTED PROFIT
If we know the probable competitors, we can obtain the
probability of winning for each bid amount, and finally,
we can find the bid amount that can generate maximum expected
profit [Ref. 8]. In this model, the possibility of tie bids
is not considered.
If we assume Z's cost estimate on this project is C,
we can find out the optimal bid amount using the previous
Table of Cumulative Probability Distribution.
First, suppose only A is Z's competitor, and Z's bid
amount is 1.50C. According to Table V, the probability that
Z will win the contract is 0.321. If Z wins, Z will make a
profit of 1.50C-C = 0.5C. So, the expected profit is
0.5C x 0.321 = 0.1605C.
If Z's bid amount is 1.30C, we obtain an expected profit
of 0.821 (1.30C - C) = 0.2463C.
Proceeding similarly, we can obtain expected profits for
each bid amount. These are summarized when only A is Z's







Expected profit where A is only
competitor
1.00 C 1.000 x <;i.ooc-c) =
1.05 c 0.964 x <[1.05C-C) = 0.0482 C
1.10 C 0-964 x 1[i.ioc-c) = 0.0964 C
1.15 C 0.928 x I:i.i5c-c) = 0.1392 C
1.20 C 0.892 X [1.200-0 = 0.1784 C
1.25 C 0.892 X [1.25C-C] = 0.2230 C
1.30 c 0.821 x [1.30C-C] = 0.2463 C
1.35 c 0.821 x [1-35C-C] = 0.28735 C
1.40 C 0.714 X [1.40C-C] = 0.2856 C
1.45 C 0.571 X (1.45C-C; = 0.25695 c
1.50 c 0.321 X (1.50C-C] z 0.1605 C
1.55 c 0.142 x [1.55C-C] 1 = 0.0781 c
1.60 c 0.142 x [1.60C-C] I z O.O852 C
1.65 c 0.071 X U.65C-C] 1 z 0.04615 C
1.70 c x (1.70C-C:) -
* Maximum expected profit comes from a bid of 1-35 C
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Clearly, a bid of 1.35C gives the maximum expected profit,
0.28735C. Consequently, empirically obtained information is
sufficient to determine the bid that maximizes expected
profit in the case where A is the only competitor.
Next, suppose Z is going to bid on some contract and
A,B,F,L,P,R and S are Z's competitors. Now the optimal bid
price of Z in this case will be determined. In this case if
Z wants to win the contract, Z's bid amount must be lower
than that of A,B,F,L,P,R and S's respectively.
For example, suppose Z's bid amount is 1.50C. In this
case, the probabilities that Z's bid amount is lower than
those of A,B,F,L,P,R and S's are 0.321, 0.233, 0.3, 0.524,
0.369, 0.374 and 0.5 87 respectively. The probability of the
joint occurrence of seven independent events is the product
of the probabilities that these seven events occur
separately [Ref. 4]. As a result, the probability Z's bid
is simultaneously lower than bids of A,B,F,L,P,R and of S is;
0.321x0.233x0.3x0.524x0.369x0.374x0.587 = 0.00095.
Proceeding similarly, using the Table V, we obtain
Table VII that shows expected profits for each Z's bid
amount.
As shown in Table VII, if the decision maker of Z knows
the competitor, he can find out the bid amount which will
generate maximum expected profit using this model.
There might be the case when Z can not know all the
competitors. For this case, Z can use the bidding distribution
49

of the average bidder, the last row of Table V, obtained
by combining all previous ratios of an opposition bid to
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By applying this model, Z can find out the bid amount
that can generate maximum expected profit in future bids.
Furthermore, if Z wants to win the contract even at a little
profit or at a strategic loss, Z can submit, a bid amount
knowing the probability of winning for that bid amount,
because Z already knows the relationship between expected
profit and competitiveness by using this data.
This model and data can be powerful tools in decision





One method of determining the bid amount that can
generate maximum expected profit has been presented. A
stochastic bidding model similar to the one presented here
has been applied by Edelman at RCA [Radio Corporation of
America). Edelman *s model was based on selecting the bid
with the highest expected profit, and the model is based on
a payoff matrix arraying the alternative bids for RCS
against possible competitive bids.
Edelman has analyzed the sensitivity of this model and
also examined the validity of this model [Ref. 9]. In
seven tests, the model improved upon the performance of the
usual bidding procedure as shown in Table VIII [Ref. 9]
.
The measure of performance was the percentage by which the





























. 53 $46 . 50 $46 . 49 4.2% 1.1%
2 47.36 42.68 42.93 (10.3) 0.6
3 62.73 59.04 60.76 (3-2) 2.8
4 47.72 51.05 53-38 10.6 4.4
5 50.18 42.80 44.16 (13.7) 3.1
6 60.39 54.61 55.10 (9-6) 0.9
7 39-73 39.73 40.47 1.8 1.8
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The model providing the winning bids in all case, was
an average of two percent below the next competitive bid,
and generated at least as much profit in all cases as the
existing procedure. In these tests, the model made a
positive contribution to improved decision making, since it
increased profits by using the same input information
available to the standard decision procedure [Ref. 9].
By the validity test of Edelman, Z construction company
can apply the model presented in this thesis and use all the
previous data to make a decision of optimal price in




In summary, the model presented in this thesis provides
an optimal price in competitive bidding. The presentation
is by a case study of the Z construction company. The
process is as follows;
a. Accumulating past data
b. Obtaining the probability distribution and cumulative
probability distribution for each competitor
c. Obtaining the probability of winning the contract
d. Finally, obtaining the bid amount, the multiple of
cost estimate , that can generate maximum expected
profit.
As explained in the section on the validity test, the
scientific approach in the field of competitive bidding can
contribute to enhancing profit and competitiveness. During
recent years, there has been a surprisingly large amount of
bidding for overseas projects, especially in the middle
east area. This boom has contributed to the economic
development of Korea. But the competition has become
keener and keener.
In order to be successful in this field, we must
concentrate all of our effort on improving the management
system. Furthermore, if every construction company prepar-
ing for overseas projects and the Association of Overseas
Construction apply this model to improve their system of
56

management, especially in competitive bidding, the model
presented is a powerful and effective tool for competitive-
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